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Introduction
Under the current law the primary benefit of the patent system-
disclosure-is challenged. Patents exist to benefit the public; benefits
to the inventor are secondary.1 Since the Federal Circuit decided
Underwater in 1983 and started down a path toward severely
penalizing knowing infringement, every company has had an incentive
to not utilize the disclosures of issued patents. As the law stands now,
once a patentee shows that an infringer might have known of a patent,
the burden shifts to the infringer, who must prove innocence of
willfulness. As a result, willful infringement is pleaded so often that
judges must think it is a single word.
We propose to change the standard for finding willfulness to
restore the proper balance to the patent system. We propose requiring
the patentee to notify the alleged infringer of the potential
infringement and that willfulness only be possible for literal
infringement. By requiring this affirmative step on the part of the
patentee and allowing potential infringers to determine with more
certainty whether they infringe, the patent system will return to a
status where the public interest is of paramount importance.
I
Background Considerations
The patent system was created for the purpose of disclosing
inventions to the public that represent an advance in the state of the
art.2 The tradeoff between a limited monopoly and disclosure was
intended to give inventors incentive to make the public aware of their
discoveries. Those who infringed upon this limited monopoly were
liable to the patent-owner for the resulting damages. In particular,
those who willfully infringed the patent could suffer enhanced
damages.
A. Justification for the Patent Laws
The patent laws exists to foster innovation and bring the fruits of
invention to the public. The Founding Fathers believed that progress
in the useful arts was important enough to include it in the
1. See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942).
2. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1.974); Graham v.
John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1966) (Jefferson believed patents should only go to inventors
who significantly furthered human knowledge).
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Constitution.3 Congress implemented a system that grants a right to
exclude others from capitalizing on an invention for 20 years from the
date of filing an application for a patent.4 However, the courts have
long recognized that the public interest comes first in the patent
system.
5
To obtain the valuable right to exclude, a patent owner must
disclose his invention in an application to the United States Patent and
Trademark Office.6 The Patent Office then examines the application
to determine if it discloses a patentable invention that can be
understood by others skilled in the relevant art.7 The Patent Office
maintains the secrecy of the application during the examination
process.' If the patent owner proves the invention patentable, the
Patent Office then issues the patent.9 Copies of issued patents are
available to libraries and to the general public upon request to the
Patent Office and payment of nominal fees.' Moreover, patents are
becoming increasingly available on the Internet.
We expect that patent owners will take additional affirmative
steps to enforce their patents. Under current law, they must sue an
infringer, and provide notice of infringement to obtain damages. We
do not classify patent infringement as criminal, as the Germans,
Japanese, and Chinese do.1 Thus, as with personal injuries and other
torts, the burden is on the patent owner to come into court and prove
injuries and causation.12 However, where willfulness exists we shift the
3. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271 (1997) (term of patent and right to exclude respectively).
5. See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. at 278. ("promotion of the progress
of science and the useful arts is the 'main object'; reward of inventors is secondary and
merely a means to that end."); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665
(1944) ("It is the public interest which is dominant in the patent system.") (citations
omitted); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. at 1, 8-9 (1966) (Jefferson believed
the monopoly was an inducement to bring forth knowledge for public purposes.)
6. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1997).
7. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 131 (1997) (content of application and examination system
respectively).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1997).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 151 (1997).
10. 35 U.S.C. §§ 11, 13, 41 (1997) (publication of patents, supply to libraries, and fees
respectively) (the fee for a year's patents to a library is $50).
11. See Irving L. Kayton et. al., 1 PATENT PRACTICE 1-7, (PRI 1993) (Germany and
Japan have criminal statutes for infringement of patents); Yu Jianyang, Review of Patent
Infringement Litigation in the People's Republic of China, 5 J. CHINESE L. 297, 301 (1991)
(China has a similar criminal statute).
12. See Kegel Co. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (patent
owner has burden of proving infringement).
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burden of proof to the infringer. We expect the willful infringer to
prove innocence instead of having the patent owner prove guilt. In
fact, our present approach is closer to assuming willfulness than the
presumption of innocence afforded a criminal defendant.
B. Willfulness
Willful infringement is a question of fact for the jury. 3 The jury
considers state of mind, intent,' and culpability of the infringer. 4
Standards include "whether the infringer exercised care to respect the
legal rights of the patentee, whether sound legal advice was timely
obtained," whether copying occurred, whether the infringer's actions
were reasonable, and the relationship between the infringer and the
patentee. 15 Upon a finding of willful infringement, the district court
has discretion to enhance damages by up to three times, taking into
account numerous factors that reflect the interests of justice.1 6
Awarding enhanced damages for willful infringement serves at
least three purposes. First, enhanced damages can serve as a penalty
for egregious acts by infringers. 7 Second, the prospect of enhanced
damages gives potential infringers an incentive to consider the
consequences before disregarding the rights of a patent owner.' 8
Third, enhanced damages can make a patent owner whole where
actual damages will not suffice. 9 The drawback is that enhanced
damages can serve as a windfall to patent owners and as a tool for
harassing the innocent infringer.
1. Penalty for Egregious Acts
Penalizing' egregious acts by infringers serves to deter future
infringer's violations of patent owner's rights. In Power Lift Inc. v.
Lang Tools, Inc.2" Wendell Lang, president of Lang Tools, based his
hydraulic lifting system on Power Lift's system, and went so far as
having his son measure dimensions of Power Lift's system.2' When the
Power Lift patent was issued, Power Lift contacted Wendell Lang and
13. See National Presto Indus., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1192 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
14. See id.
15. Id. at 1193.
16. See id. at 1193-4.
17. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 819 F.2d 1120,1125-26 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. 774 F.2d 478 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
21. Id. at 481.
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offered him a license.22 Lang replied that "before he would pay
[Power Lift] a nickel, he'd see [Power Lift] in the courthouse."23 For
copying the Power Lift system and disregarding Power Lift's patent
rights, both the jury and the Federal Circuit found Lang Tools to be a
willful infringer. 24
2. Deterrence-Think Before Infringing
Just as punitive damages in tort cases serve to deter future torts,
enhanced damages in patent cases serve to deter future willful
infringement. By giving potential willful infringers notice that they
may incur enhanced damages, the law encourages these potential
infringers to investigate their exposure to liability and mitigate that
exposure. This mitigation can occur through licensing or designing
around the patent. By licensing the patent, the potential infringer not
only benefits the owner, but also benefits the public by providing at
least one source of the patented invention. By designing around the
patent, the potential infringer may advance the state of the art and
thereby further benefit the public. One must bear in mind that failed
attempts to design around a patent can also benefit the public, if
nothing else by proving the value of the invention. Experimentation
with new ideas such as those from a patent is an integral part of the
process of research.
3. Make the Patentee Whole where Damages Inadequate
Aside from deterring future infringement, enhanced damages
from willfulness also help make the patentee whole where damages
prove inadequate.25 Where a patentee has the capacity to manufacture
the infringing products26 and the court finds the infringer willful, the
court may use enhanced damages to compensate the patentee for
having lost market dominance. The Federal Circuit expressly forbids
consideration of inadequacy of damages when deciding willfulness. 27
One reason is that if seeming inadequacy colors a court's
determination on the willfulness issue, it would prejudice the
infringer. Furthermore, if the patentee would have granted a license
22. Id. at 482.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
26. See Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
27. See Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing and Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d
1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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and is getting attorneys' fees, the enhanced damages may simply be a
windfall.
II
Current Law
The current law on willful infringement springs from section
284.28 Courts have awarded treble damages for willful infringement
under section 284.29 Shortly after opening its doors in 1982,30 the
Federal Circuit, developed a body of law surrounding willful
infringement that sets findings of willfulness apart from any other area
of the law.
31
A. Statute
Currently, section 284 in its entirety states:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty for the use made of the invention by the
infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the
court.
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court
shall assess them. In either event the court may increase
the damages up to three times the amount found or
assessed.
The court may receive expert testimony as an aid to the
determination of damages or of what royalty would be
reasonable under the circumstances. 32
The relevant language, "the court may increase the damages up
to three times[,] ' 33 provides the only statutory basis for findings of
28. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1997).
29. See, e.g., Beatrice Foods Co., 923 F.2d at 1579.
30. The Federal Circuit was created in 1982 and has jurisdiction over all appeals in
cases arising under the patent laws. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1997) (Federal Circuit
jurisdiction).
31. See infra Part B.3 of this section.
32. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1997) (emphasis ours).
33. Id.
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enhanced damages for willful infringement.34 The Federal Circuit has
interpreted this sparse statutory language to mean that damages may
only be enhanced when the infringer is found to be willful. 35
B. Federal Circuit Landmark Cases
1. Underwater-A New Standard
In 1983, the Federal Circuit decided Underwater Devices Inc. v.
Morrison-Knudsen Co. (hereinafter Underwater)36 and ushered in a
whole new approach to willful infringement liability. Underwater
requires that potential infringers with knowledge of a patent,
investigate the scope of that patent to avoid infringing it.37 The
Federal Circuit relied on Milgo Electronics v. United Business
Communications38 for this proposition. 39 However, Underwater holds
that the affirmative duty to avoid infringing includes seeking advice of
competent patent counsel and investigating the prosecution history of
the patent.4 ° Milgo Electronics held that once a potential infringer
receives notice of a patent it must attempt to avoid potential
infringement. 41 While the idea of a good faith belief of non-
infringement as a defense to willfulness was not new, Underwater
raised the bar by requiring an infringer to seek the advice of counsel
and undertake an investigation into the prosecution history of the
patent.42
In fact, Underwater does not actually require an opinion of
counsel so much as it makes litigation without it foolhardy.
Underwater effectively shifted the burden of proof, whereas the patent
owner once had to prove willful infringement, now the patent owner
merely must prove notice of the patent and then the alleged infringer
must prove that it acted reasonably in fulfilling this affirmative duty.43
Prior to the Underwater decision, courts referred to the need for an
34. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
35. Id. at 830-31.
36. 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
37. Id. at 1389-90.
38. 623 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1980).
39. See Underwater, 717 F.2d at 1389-90.
40. Id. at 1390.
41. Milgo Electronics, 623 F.2d at 666.
42. Underwater, 717 F.2d at 1389-90.
43. See id. (discussing affirmative duty to investigate patents).
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honest doubt as to patent validity or infringement, without the
emphasis on an opinion of counsel."
2. Central Soya-Follow the Advice
By the end of 1983, the Federal Circuit had published another
opinion on the subject of willful infringement. In Central Soya
Company v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co.," the court considered a situation
where the infringer claimed to have relied on advice of counsel both
before and after beginning infringing activities.4 6 However, the
evidence showed that Hormel had only received the opinion of
counsel, and that it failed to follow the advice contained in the
opinion.47 Hormel sought advice of counsel on setting up a production
line to produce pork loin fritters that would compete with Central
Soya's products.48 Hormel even hired Central Soya's key employee to
set up the production line.49 As a result, Hormel consulted a patent
attorney who investigated what it would take to avoid infringing
Central Soya's patent on production of pork loin fritters.5" The result
of this investigation included an opinion letter indicating that if the
fritters did not expand over 100% during production there would be
no infringement.5 Although Hormel was aware of their potential
liability, they did not monitor expansion of the fritters during
production for over two years.52 As a result, the court found that
Hormel had not relied on the opinion to form a good-faith belief of
non-infringement.53
3. Kloster Speedsteel-Permitting the Adverse Inference
In 1986, before the District Courts had an opportunity to
implement the opinion of counsel standard set forth in Underwater,54
the Federal Circuit held that where the infringer does not assert the
44. See Wilden Pump & Eng'g Co. v. Pressed & Welded Prod. Co., 655 F.2d 984, 989-
90 (9th Cir. 1981).
45. 723 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
46. Id. at 1577.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1575-76.
50. Id. at 1576-77.
51. Id. at 1577.
52. Id.
53. id.
54. See Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1579 (1986) ("The
district court did not have before it, of course, the guidance on the law of willful patent
infringement provided by this court since the time of the trial.")
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advice of counsel defense to willfulness the court may conclude that
either no advice of counsel was sought or the advice was negative. 55
This allows an adverse inference to be drawn against even those
infringers who assert the attorney-client privilege. 56 This does not
occur in any other area of the law.57 In fact, at the Federal Circuit
Judicial Conference in 1996, one panelist pointed out that the Fourth
Circuit rejects adverse inferences in such areas as tax and contract
disputes when a party asserts the attorney-client privilege.58 Another
panelist, Judge Sue Robinson.of the United States District Court for
the District of Delaware indicated that she knew of no other area of
law that permitted such an adverse inference.59
4. Read v. Portec, Inc.60 -Listing Factors
By 1992, enough litigation had occurred in this area that the
Federal Circuit had a list of nine factors for courts to consider in
determining whether the totality of the circumstances constituted
willfulness.61 These include: forming a good-faith belief of invalidity or
non-infringement, deliberate copying, behavior during litigation, size
and finances of infringer, closeness of the case, duration of
misconduct, remedial actions, infringer's motivation, and attempts to
conceal misconduct.6 2  Since willful infringement requires
consideration of the totality of the circumstances, the Federal Circuit
has emphasized. that there can be no hard and fast rules on
willfulness.63 However, most of these factors provide a good starting
point for coverage of the law of willfulness.
C. Federal Circuit Interpretations of the Read64 Factors
As will be apparent from the following discussions, the Federal
Circuit has provided numerous opinions to help the public interpret
the various factors listed in Read. Since the cases focus primarily on
55. See id. at 1580.
56. See id.
57. See Fourteenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, 170 F.R.D. 534, 619 (1996) (Panelist Barry Grossman).
58. See id.
59. See id. at 620 (Panelist Judge Sue Robinson of the Delaware District Court).
60. 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
61. Id.
62. See id. at 826-27.
63. See, e.g., Graco Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 725, 792 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing
Rolls Royce v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1110 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
64. Read, 970 F.2d at 816.
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the presence or absence of an opinion of counsel and whether such an
opinion was reliable we will also focus our analysis on those factors.
However, what follows includes some discussion of most of the Read
factors, and some other notable issues.
1. Forming a Good-Faith Belief of Invalidity or Non-Infringement-
Opinions of Counsel
When one has notice of a patent that may be relevant to their
business, they have a duty to investigate the scope of that patent.65 To
avoid willful infringement, the potential infringer must form a good
faith belief that their actions will not infringe or that the patent is
invalid or unenforceable. 66 Investigating the scope of the patent and
forming a good faith belief typically involve consulting a qualified
patent attorney and obtaining their opinion.
67
a. Opinions of Counsel-Contents
The Federal Circuit has regularly indicated that an opinion of
counsel must contain sufficient indicia of credibility to allow the
recipient to reasonably rely on it.68 In practice, this means that the
patent attorney must study the prosecution history of the patent in
question;69 state that he or she has studied the prosecution history;70
and include reasons for either invalidity, unenforceability, or non-
infringement of the patent in question.71 For non-infringement, the
patent attorney must analyze every claim of the patent separately for
each product in question.72 Likewise, invalidity requires analyzing
each claim separately. 73 Since unenforceability pertains to a patent as
a whole,74 that analysis need not focus on each claim.
65. See id. at 827; see also Underwater, 717 F.2d at 1389-90.
66. See Read, 970 F.2d at 826-7 (citing Bott v. Four Star, 807 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed.
Cir. 1986)).
67. See Underwater at 1390.
68. See e.g. Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
69. See Underwater at 1390.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1259
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
73. See Underwater at 1390.
74. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, 747 F.2d 1553, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (if
any claim of a patent is unenforceable, all claims of the patent are unenforceable).
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b. Opinions of Counsel-Timing
While the opinion of counsel need not be prepared immediately
on learning of potential infringement, the timing of both seeking and
receiving the opinion bears on the issue of willfulness.75 There is no
grace period.76 Willfulness can begin upon notice of the patent.77
However, some cases have held that delay in seeking an opinion will
not defeat development of a good faith belief of non-infringement.78
c. Totality of the Circumstances
Ultimately, the totality of the circumstances must be considered
by the court in making a finding on willfulness.7 9 While an opinion of
counsel on infringement and validity is expected, a good faith belief of
invalidity or non-infringement can be formed without such an
opinion.80 However, most cases where no opinion of counsel was
obtained result in a finding of willfulness.81 So, the most prudent thing
for a potential infringer to do is to seek the opinion of counsel.
2. Deliberate Copying
Deliberate copying has confronted many courts over the years.8 2
For instance, a statement by an infringer indicating a willingness to
copy anything regardless of patent rights would tend to evidence
willfulness. Also, copying need not occur after the patent issues,
though notice of existence of the patent is a prerequisite to
willfulness.83
3. Behavior During Litigation
Behavior during litigation, such as misconduct, can influence a
court's willfulness finding.84 However, the Federal Circuit has stated
explicitly that enhanced damages cannot be awarded based solely on
75. See, e.g., Critikon, 120 F.3d at 1259 (opinion must come before infringing acts to
rely on good faith belief).
76. See Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
77. Id.
78. See Sensonics Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
79. See King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853,867 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
80. See id.
81. See, e.g., Kloster Speedsteel at 1579-80.
82. See Read, 970 F.2d at 827.
83. See Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Labs, Inc., 794 F.2d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
84. See Read, 970 F.2d at 827.
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misconduct during litigation.85 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit
indicates that a vigorous defense evidences non-willfulness. 86
4. Closeness of the Case
As mentioned earlier, the Federal Circuit considers a vigorous
defense as evidence that the infringer has a good faith belief in
invalidity or non-infringement.87 A vigorous defense generally results
from the infringers concern over an injunction or treble damages.
However, the court has chosen to take the more charitable view that a
close case in the court validates a good faith belief in non-
infringement. 88
5. Duration of Misconduct
Duration of misconduct speaks to whether the infringer made
efforts to cure the infringing activity immediately upon becoming
aware of the patent in question. 89 However, it can also go to whether
the infringer sought the opinion of counsel soon after learning of
potential infringement.90 Either way, the courts tend to reward those
who take actions showing respect for a patent-owner's rights when
they learn of the patent.91
6. Remedial Actions
Remedial action by the defendant can result in no enhanced
damages or at least less than trebling of damages.92 One form of
remedial action is withdrawing a product from the market after it
becomes apparent that the product infringes a patent.93 The infringer
could also decide not to proceed with a product upon counsel advice
that it will likely infringe. 94 Another possibility is to try to design
85. See id. at 831.
86. See Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 20 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
87. See id.
88. See Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 115 F.3d 947, 955 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
89. See Read, 970 F.2d at 827.
90. See, e.g., SRI Int'l Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Lab., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1468 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
91. See, e.g., Westvaco Corp. v. International Paper Co., 991 F.2d 735, 743 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
92. See Read, 970 F.2d at 827.
93. See Rolls Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
94. See id.
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around the patent in question.95 Such good faith attempts are
sometimes the basis of a finding of non-willfulness. 96
7. Infringer's Motivation
Courts have held that if an infringer has a proper motivation to
infringe, willfulness or enhanced damages may be mitigated.97 As a
result, an infringer might not be liable for full enhanced damages if
market pressures produced the incentive to infringe.98
8. Attempts To Conceal Misconduct
Attempts by the infringer to conceal either infringing activity or
litigation misconduct can give rise to willfulness.99 In particular,
protesting to the patent owner that no infringement has occurred can
evidence willfulness.' Also, attempting to hide evidence of damages,
such as inventory and sales records, can indicate willfulness.101
D. Notice Requirements
Notice of the existence of a patent generates a substantial triable
issue. For an infringer to willfully infringe, the patent must exist, and
the infringer must be aware of it.102 As will be discussed later, what
constitutes notice is far from clear.103 However, it is clear that if the
first notice of the patent comes in the form of a suit for infringement,
such infringement cannot be willful.10 4
Once an alleged infringer has some form of notice of the patent,
the lack of hard and fast rules in this area comes to the fore. 105 Clearly
the Power Lift case discussed previously represents one extreme, in
that Lang Tools achieved willfulness even though it was sued a mere
nine days after patent issuance. 1 6 In other cases, the court has held
95. See, e.g., Westvaco, 991 F.2d. at 744.
96. Id. at 745.
97. See Read, 970 F.2d at 827.
98. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.
99. See Read, 970 F.2d at 827.
100. See SRI Int'L, 127 F.3d at 1469.
101. See Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing and Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d
1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
102. See State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
103. See infra Part III.E.
104. State Indus., 751 F.2d at 1236; see also Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Industrial
Products, Inc., 897 F.2d 508, 510 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
105. See Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1110 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
("in respect of willfulness, there cannot be hard and fast per se rules").
106. See Power Lift Inc. v. Lang Tools Inc., 774 F.2d 478 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see discussion
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that no time is required to develop willfulness."0 7 At least one Federal
Circuit judge has suggested that the character of infringment can
change over time, transforming from willful to non-willful and vice
versa.10 8 As a result, giving a client clear advice on whether they
willfully infringe upon a patent becomes difficult.
Another clear point from case law is that an infringer need not be
aware of their infringement.0 9 Avoiding willfulness requires a good
faith belief of either non-infringement, invalidity or unenforceability
of the patent. 110 Even when the potential infringer knows of the patent
but does not realize infringement is a possibility, the courts do not
consider this to be sufficient good faith belief.' Thus, burying your
head in the sand once you hear of a patent and not investigating its
scope will not avoid willfulness. Forming such a good faith belief
requires a diligent investigation into the patent's scope and history.
E. Totality of the Circumstances
One must bear in mind at all times that finding willfulness
requires evaluating the totality of the circumstances.112 This does not
help the potential infringer much, as it gives the potential infringer
greater incentive to investigate the patent and form a good faith belief
of non-infringement or invalidity. However, it does mean that even
without an opinion of counsel the infringer may be able to avoid a
finding of willfulness." 3 This, in turn, means that anyone accused of
willfulness has an incentive to challenge that accusation in court,
which leads to greater litigation expenses.
supra Part II.B.1.
107. See Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
108. See Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Dart Indus., Inc., 862 F.2d 1564, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (Newman, J. dissenting).
109. See Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 96 F.3d 1409, 1415 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
110. See id. at 1414.
111. See id. at 1415.
112. See Read, 970 F.2d at 826.
113. See King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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III
Effects of the Current Law
A. The Law Discourages Those Most Concerned with the Art from Reading
Patents
As it stands, commercial actors have a strong incentive to not
read patents. Two commentators recently suggested that the Federal
Circuit has indicated an infringer can have notice of a patent merely
by reading about its issuance in the Official Gazette.114 While this
reading of Stryker v. Intermedics1 1 5 seems extreme, its reasoning
cannot simply be dismissed. If an infringer reads a patent, that puts
the infringer on notice, although it may be a mitigating factor that the
infringer found the patent. 16
The purpose of the patent system is to disclose inventions to the
public and advance the state of the art.'17 Likewise, the public interest
is of paramount importance in this system, and the patent owner's
interests come second." 8 With the current state of law regarding
willfulness, the system is turned on its head. By placing potential
infringers on notice for simply reading a patent, the Federal Circuit
puts the patent owner's rights to exclude ahead of the public interest
in disclosure. As matters now stand many companies discourage
employees from reading patents. This presumably lessens the chance
that the company will be found to have knowledge of a patent.
However, this defeats the basic purpose of the patents laws,
dissemination of information.
B. Detriment to Inventors
As just discussed, the law makes reading patents detrimental. As
a result, many inventions that might be discovered and utilized go
unnoticed. This leads to inventors not receiving rewards for their
efforts. In fact, both the public and the inventors lose the benefit of
114. See William C. Rooklidge and Robert 0. Bolan, The Official Gazette and Willful
Patent Infringement: Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 79 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 605 (1997). The O.G. publishes the cover sheet of a patent and
one claim from the patent when it issues.
115. 96 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
116. See Underwater, 717 F.2d at 1389-90.
117. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974); see also supra
part I.
118. See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942).
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the invention, because the invention is not made available to the
public. To the extent that the invention is made available to the
public, it requires promotional efforts on the part of the inventor to
get the product produced or the process implemented.
C. Prejudice at Trial
One of the most damaging effects of the Underwater line of cases
is prejudice at trial. The only effective defense involves waiving the
attorney-client privilege. Additionally, the issue of willfulness often
dominates the issue of infringement at trial. Yet, the patent-owner
risks no adverse consequences for pleading willful infringement.
1. Only Effective Defense Requires Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege
By forcing the alleged infringer to choose between waiving the
attorney-client privilege or suffering from an adverse inference, the
courts hand the patent owners a strategic advantage. While one would
hope that courts would limit the scope of such a waiver of attorney-
client privilege, determining where to draw such a line proves
surprisingly difficult. At least one court has held that the waiver
extends to otherwise undiscoverable trial preparation documents.1 19 If
the alleged infringer chooses to withhold an exculpatory opinion of
counsel for understandable fear of a broad waiver of the attorney-
client privilege, the adverse inference can be a severe penalty. 120
2. Issue of Willfulness Dominates Issue of Infringement
Studies of juries do not tell us much about how a particular case
will proceed, but they do tell us something about how the system as a
whole is functioning. For example, jury trials rose from 2.5% of patent
cases in 1970 to 51% of patent cases in 1992.121 A jury consulting
service reports that jurors typically "equate knowing infringement
with willful infringement" and "scoff when [alleged infringers] counter
that they sought advice of counsel before deciding to ignore the
patent. 1 22 These findings tend to indicate that jury trials give patent
119. See Michael M. Markman, Patent Opinions, Privileges, and the Advice of Counsel
Defense to Claims of Willful Patent Infringement: Litigation Counsel Caught in the
Crossfire, 19 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 949, 981 (1997).
120. See id. at 952.
121. Nichola M. Cannella and Timothy J. Kelly, Jury Trials and Mock Jury Trials, in
PATENT LITIGATION 1993, at 731, 738 (PLI/Pat Patents, Trademarks and Literary
Property Course Handbook Series PLI Order No. 64-3909, Nov., Dec. 1993).
122. Robert D. Minck and David H. Weinberg, How Jurors See the Issues in Patent
Cases, in JURY RESEARCH 1993, at 71 (PLI/Corp Corporate Law, and Practice Course
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owners an advantage and that evidence on willful infringement can
prejudice a jury.
Not surprisingly, the Federal Circuit is more likely to reverse a
judge than a jury on the issue of willful infringement. Courts in
general hesitate to reverse jury findings, thus the appeals court will
only reverse when no reasonable jury could have found willfulness.1 23
With bench trials, the Federal Circuit will reverse where the court
makes specific findings that are clearly erroneous, although it will
often remands for reconsideration.124
3. No Adverse Consequences to Pleading Willful Infringement Without Merit
According to one commentator, a survey of all patent cases filed
in a single district court for part of 1997 showed that every complaint
alleged willful infringement.'25 At the Federal Circuit Judicial
Conference of 1996, Judge Sue Robinson indicated that in the District
Court for the District of Delaware, 87% of all patent cases included an
allegation of willful infringement. 126 The patent owners cannot be
blamed. Pleading willful infringement is the gateway to treble
damages, and because of the waiver issue'provides a window to the
opponent's trial strategy. Furthermore, there is no downside, not even
a heightened standard of pleading similar to that found with the
inequitable conduct defense.
C. Waste of Resources in Opinions
1. Defenses Known Only to the Patentee
The patent owner currently need only inform someone of the
existence and possible relevance of its patent; the patent owner does
not have to reveal what it knows about its patents. Frequently, the
best prior art that could invalidate the patent is known only to the
patent owner. This can include references withheld during
prosecution, public uses and offers for sale, even derivation from
Handbook Series PLI Order No. 34-7046, Dec. 1993).
123. See, e.g., Therma-Tru Corp. v. Peachtree Doors Inc., 44 F.3d 988, 996-97 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
124. See, e.g., Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Indus. Prod., Inc., 897 F.2d 508, 510-11
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (reversing district court finding of willfulness but where party had notice
of patent).
125. See Ira V. Heffnan, Willful Patent Infringement, 7 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 115, 155-57
(1997).
126. See Fourteenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, 170 F.R.D. 534, 619 (1996) (Panelist Judge Sue Robinson of the
Delaware District Court).
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another source. A patent owner could know full well that its patent is
invalid, give notice sufficient to raise fear of willfulness and yet avoid
a declaratory judgment action for invalidity.
2. Expense of Preparation
A reliable patent opinion costs at least $10,000 if the patent has
any real complexity. Indeed, an opinion on a set of "submarine"
patents will cost well over $100,000. Not included are internal costs to
the company involved in communicating with employees to get
information on products or processes, time spent reviewing the patent
by corporate officers, and delays induced in projects due to possible
infringement issues.
3. Individual Inventors and Their Letters
Some mass mailings such as occurred on behalf of Messrs
Lemelson and Hyatt placed at least 100 companies on notice of
patents having several hundred claims and applications dating back in
one case to the 1950s. The file wrappers of the Hyatt patents include
court transcripts from a trial and appeals that number in the thousands
of pages. Obtaining letters for these cases is a burden even for larger
companies and a waste of both economic and social resources. In
contrast, the patent owner can trigger the requirement for this effort
with a simple letter and without any meaningful investigation.
D. Waste of Resources in Litigation
Once willful infringement is pleaded, it must be resolved. This
leads to disputes over what is discoverable and how broad a waiver
will be. In some cases bifurcation is needed to preserve the rights of
the defendant. All of this adds to the costs of patent litigation, wastes
the court's time and resources, and makes patent litigation for the
parties a "sport of kings."
E. Uncertainty in the Law
By leaving potential infringers wondering whether they infringed
and whether they have avoided the scienter aspect of willfulness, we
create uncertainty and therefore more economic inefficiency. A
company might even abandon an important project due to concerns
about willfulness. This is detrimental to consumers who may lose out
on better products, investors who may lose out on long-term profits,
and workers who may not be able to pursue rewarding and challenging
opportunities.
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Proposal
A. Amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 284
Currently, section 284 states:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no
event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the
invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed
by the court.
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess
them. In either event the court may increase the damages up to
three times the amount found or assessed.
The court may receive expert testimony as an aid to the
determination of damages or of what royalty would be reasonable
under the circumstances.12
7
We propose to amend the second paragraph of section 284 to
read as follows:
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess
them. In either event the court may increase the damages up to
three times the amount found or assessed if the court finds clear and
convincing evidence of willful infringement. Willful infringement
shall require literal infringement without reliance on equivalency
and shall require either (1) actual notice with a reasonable time to
study the patent prior to litigation by a patent owner of the products
or methods that infringe specified claims of a patent, or (2) clear and
convincing evidence of copying of a product marked in accordance
with the requirements of section 287 of this code.
This change in the statute will produce a number of changes in
current practices of both patent owners and potential infringers. If
nothing else, it should restore the proper priorities to the patent
system by putting the public, interest in disclosure before the patent
owner's interest in rights to exclude. Likewise, it makes the patent
system a self-help system. This is preferable to giving the patent owner
a draconian method to enforce weak patents.
B. Comparison to Current Standards
1. Current Willfulness Standard
Currently,. a possible infringer is on notice when that infringer
learns of a patent. This standard is very low. Ordering the patent from
127. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1997).
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the patent office is more than sufficient. 128 However, it is arguable
whether an infringer is put on notice when he sees the issuance of the
patent in the Official Gazette. 129
2. Current Marking Notice
Currently, an infringer is on notice for damages when all patented
products are either marked or unauthorized, or the patent owner
provides specific notice of infringement to the alleged infringer. 130
This standard is significantly higher than the current willfulness
standard, but lower than the proposed new standard in that it does not
require identification of specific claims.
3. Current Declaratory Judgment Action
To have standing for a Declaratory Judgment Action, an infringer
must have both an imminent threat of suit from the patent owner and
an expectation that infringing activity will occur or continue.131 This
could be a lower standard than willfulness, but it is not strictly
comparable as it depends on the course of conduct between the
parties.
C. Expected Positive Effects of Our Proposed Standard
1. Reading Patents Will Not Be a Dangerous Sport
Those interested in a particular technology will be able to take
advantage of the disclosure process again. The current state of the law
on willfulness provides a powerful incentive for prohibiting the
reading of patents. This runs directly counter to the' idea that
inventors trade disclosure of their inventions for a limited monopoly.
Forcing patent owners to notify infringers of their liability, eliminates
liability for simply investigating the technology and then attempting,
but failing, to design around current patents.
2. Benefit to Inventors
As patents are more widely read, it will spark interest in some
inventions that otherwise would remain unknown, and may create
more demand for licenses. Even the cynics will agree that at a
128. See Stryker, 96 F.3d at 1415.
129. See Rooklidge and Bolan, supra note 114.
130. See Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 1.84-86 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
131. See Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. Alza Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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minimum it may create more infringement, but that alone is better for
an inventor than obscurity.
3. Clarifies what Infringement Qualifies as Willful
By requiring literal infringement more certainty is provided to the
potential infringer. As it now stands, the infringer takes the risk by
determining the scope of a claim under an equivalency analysis. (This
includes not only the Doctrine of Equivalents but also equivalence
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6). In effect, we are proposing that willfulness
only be possible for cases of clear infringement.
4. Eases the Prospects of Prejudice
With willfulness governed by a simpler and clearer rule, the court
or jury will typically experience less prejudicial evidence than it
currently does. As discussed previously, juries are often prejudiced by
the willfulness issue in patent infringement suits. Likewise, courts can
be swayed by evidence of knowing infringement to make a finding of
willfulness under the totality of the circumstances. If a bright-line rule
requiring notice from the patent owner exists, courts and juries will
not have that uncertainty about whether an infringer's actions were
willful. Likewise, litigation will concentrate more on whether actual
infringement occurred instead of whether the infringer intended to
infringe.
5. Eliminates Some of the Waste of Resources
Some of the wasted resources, both in litigation and in
preparation will be diverted to more useful purposes.. As it stands, a
large technology company can easily spend a large amount of time and
effort to learn that a patent is invalid before litigation is ever
threatened, and any lawsuit necessarily drains corporate resources. By
requiring patent owners to notify infringers of their possible liability
we allow corporations to direct their efforts toward pursuing
traditional lines of business.
6. Clarifies Notice Situation
By clarifying the notice requirements, corporations will know
when they are on notice and be able to plan ahead in a more effective
manner. As discussed previously, licensing will also be an easier task.
Furthermore, corporations could concentrate their resources on the
patents they have been warned of, and devote the rest of their
resources to pursuits such as innovation. More importantly,
corporations will know whether to continue to produce an item that
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may infringe, and investors will have a better understanding of a
company's potential liability.
D. Possible Negative Effects of Our Proposed Standard
1. Declaratory Judgment Actions
The standard here is whether there is a threat of suit and an
expectation that infringing acts will continue.1 32 However, this will
probably be governed by the parties' course of conduct, so this change
may not be an issue. If a patent owner was likely to threaten suit and
trigger jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment action before, that will
still be true. If a patent owner was likely to tread carefully and not
threaten suit prematurely, that will also still be true.
2. Allows Infringer to Ignore Patent
By forcing the patentee to alert the infringer to their
infringement, infringers get an opportunity to ignore patent rights. In
effect, an infringer could produce infringing products, without concern
for liability beyond lost profits of the patent owner, until the patent
owner specifically notified the infringer of his concerns. However, it
seems unwise for infringers to expand into a market if profits might be
paid to a competitor.
V
Other Proposals
Several proposals for dealing with the problems of willfulness
have emerged over the years. The sheer number of proposals and their
variety suggest that this is a serious problem and that it does not have
a simple solution. We will discuss proposals involving bifurcation of
trials, staging of trials, an agency standard for notice, and focusing on
the infringer's state of mind. Additionally, elimination of the adverse
inference of Kloster Speedsteel has been proposed, but this seems
unlikely to realistically change things. While some of these proposals
have advantages, they each come with serious problems.
132. See id.
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A. Bifurcation of Trials
133
Bifurcation of trials presents an opportunity for reduction or
elimination of prejudice. Presumably, the parties would litigate the
willfulness issue after a decision is reached on liability. The Federal
Circuit has indicated that bifurcation is a desirable method for dealing
with the alleged infringer's dilemma of whether to disclose its trial
strategy or risk an adverse inference on the issue of willfulness.
134
Also, the Federal Circuit has said that reversal for failure to bifurcate
the trial on the issue of willfulness is not always required in cases
involving attorney-client communications. 135 This does not even
address the issue of prejudice involved in jurors' tendencies to equate
knowing infringement with willful infringement.
136
However, courts have discretion as to whether and to what extent
a trial should be bifurcated.'37 Often, courts will bifurcate a trial
between liability and damages, including willfulness in the damages
phase. However, these same courts may well choose not to stay
discovery on the willfulness issue. As a result the alleged infringer may
be forced to choose whether to reveal its trial strategy on liability
prior to the liability trial or risk a later adverse inference on
willfulness.138 Furthermore, the losing party may not appeal the
decisions on discovery or bifurcation prior to final adjudication of the
case, with the only possible exception being for an interlocutory
appeal.139
The discretionary nature of bifurcation is unquestionably
important, because bifurcation creates scheduling nightmares for
courts.140 A court trying a patent case may well need to have four
133. See Robert Neuner, Willful Infringement, in PATENT LITIGATION 1996, at 177,
194-97 (PLI/PAT Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Literary Property Course
Handbook Series, PLI Order No. 64-3982, Nov. 1996).
134. See Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
135. See Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 644 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
136. See Robert D. Minck and David H. Weinberg, How Jurors See the Issues in Patent
Cases, in JURY RESEARCH 1993, at 71 (PLI/Corp Corporate Law and Practice Course
Handbook Series, PLI Order No. 34-7046, Dec. 1993).
137. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
138. See, e.g., Haney v. Timesavers Inc., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1159, 1160 (D. Or. 1992)
(granting bifurcated trials on liability and damages but refusing a stay of discovery on
willfulness).
139. See Quantum Corp., 940 F.2d at 644 (although bifurcation is recommended for
dealing with willfulness, refusal to bifurcate or stay discovery is not appealable under the
Cohen doctrine nor are they necessarily certifiable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 for interlocutory
appeal).
140. See Federal Circuit Judicial Conference, 170 F.R.D., at 622-23 (1996) (Panelist
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separate trials, one for claim construction (not technically a trial), one
for liability, one for willfulness and one for damages.' 4 ' Fitting these
separate trials on a crowded' court calendar would be difficult in and
of itself. It involves more problems if the trials are jury trials, since the
same jury must hear the whole case.
B. Staging
Staging of trials allows a court to ease prejudice without creating
the scheduling nightmare inherent in bifurcation. Staging involves first
presenting one segment of the case by each side, then moving on to
the next segment.'42 Thus, there might be a liability and a damages
stage in a trial, with the sequence being: plaintiff's liability evidence,
defendant's liability evidence, plaintiff's damages evidence, and
defendant's damages evidence. To eliminate prejudice, the judge
might have the jury deliberate on special verdicts for each stage.
While this approach could resolve some of the issues of prejudice,
it suffers from at least two problems. First, staging of a single trial
implies that all discovery occurs beforehand, thereby prejudicing the
alleged infringer.14 3 Second, staging would tend to involve a disjointed
presentation of the evidence that might confuse the jury.144 As a
result, we still manage to disadvantage the alleged infringer while
simultaneously introducing more unpredictability into the system.
C. Agency Standard for Notice
One recent article advances an agency standard for determining a
corporation's notice of a patent. 145 Rooklidge and Bolan argue that
the current standard for determining notice needs clarification. 146
They propose to use a standard borrowed from the Restatement
(Second) of the Law of Agency to determine when a corporate
employee's actions put the corporation on notice of a patent. 47 The
Judge Sue Robinson of the Delaware District Court).
141. See id. (Panelist Barry Grossman).
142. See id. at 623 (Panelist Barry Grossman).
143. See id. at 623-24 (Panelist Joseph Potenza).
144. See id. at 623 (Judge Robinson).
145. See William C. Rooklidge and Robert 0. Bolan, The Official Gazette and Willful
Patent Infringement: Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 79 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 605, 607 (1997).
146. See id. at 615-16.
147. See id. at 616.
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authors express alarm at the result in Stryker v. Intermedics148 and
respond with this proposal. 149
While the notice standard could use clarification, their proposal
does not address the problems in this area for at least two reasons.
First, Rooklidge and Bolan construe Stryker too broadly. They claim
that a corporation could be put on notice simply because an employee
chose to read the notice of patent issuance published in the Official
Gazette. 5 ' In Stryker, the infringer was found to be on notice as of the
employee's reading of the notice in the Official Gazette.151 However,
the employee, upon reading the notice, ordered the patent from the
patent office.'52 Furthermore, the employee, a patent attorney, may
have been involved in production of the infringing device. 153 The
District Court had enough evidence before it to indicate that the
corporation had actual notice of the patent and a possible
infringement problem. 154 As such, construing Stryker to indicate that
reading the minimal information in the Official Gazette puts a
corporation on notice strains the opinion and facts in the case.
Second, what Rooklidge and Bolan propose would change the
standard for notice without significantly clarifying it. Rooklidge and
Bolan propose a multi-factor test for agency that involves evaluating
the totality of the circumstances. 155 So, instead of determining when a
corporation learned of a patent, a court would have to determine
when a corporate employee with sufficient responsibilities learned of a
patent. This might somewhat clarify who can put a corporation on
notice. However, those individuals would still have no incentive to
read patents, thereby frustrating the purpose of the patent system.
148. 96 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
149. See Rooklidge and Bolan, supra note 145, at 606.
150. See Id. at 612-613.
151. Stryker, 96 F.3d at 1415.
152. See id. at 1416.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See Rooklidge and Bolan, supra note 145, at 616-21 (The test is not a traditional
totality of the circumstances test, but requires evaluation of whether the employee should
have known of the importance of the patent, and whether the employee had a duty to
inform the company of the patent, both of which would require looking at the totality of
the circumstances).
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D. Focus on the Infringer's State of Mind
One commentator suggests that the determination of willful
infringement applies solely to the infringer's state of mind.156 The
commentator, Richard Rainey, points to several cases for support.
The Federal Circuit has pointed out that willfulness is determined by
the infringer's state of mind.157 Rainey indicates that the preferable
approach is to frame the issues from the infringer's point of view,
instead of the way they are currently framed.158
In particular, he cites with approval one district court decision
that listed factors for consideration including: 1) when the infringer
sought advice, 2) what the infringer knew of the attorney's
qualifications, and 3) whether the opinion contained sufficient
evidence to support the infringer's reliance thereon.159 While this
statement of considerations focuses on the infringer's state of mind, it
is not a change in the current law. Pursuant to Rainey's argument,
fewer facts are relevant to the determination of willfulness than the
statement of factors in Read, because Read did not sufficiently focus
on the infringer's state of mind.16' However, this ignores the state of
the current law, which makes it clear that the focus is the infringer's
state of mind.161 With the law's current focus on the infringer's state of
mind, we have problems of prejudice of alleged infringers and
uncertainty, so Rainey does not really provide a solution at all.
VI
Conclusion
Requiring the patentee to notify the alleged infringer of the
potential infringement and requiring literal infringement will restore
balance to the patent system. The patent system exists, in large part, to
provide the public with disclosure of innovation. Beginning with
Underwater in 1983, the courts have penalized utilization of patent
disclosure by severely penalizing knowing infringement. Instead of
placing the burden of proving innocence of willfulness on a potential
infringer, our proposal would change the standard for willfulness.
156. Richard L. Rainey, Willful Infringement and Opinions of Counsel: It's the Client's
State of Mind, 493 PLI/PAT 225 (1997).
157. See Read, 970 F.2d at 928.
158. Rainey, supra note 156, at 235-40.
159. Id. at 239 (citing Thorn EMI N. Am. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 837 F. Supp. 616, 620
(D. Del. 1993)).
160. Id. at 239.
161. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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Doing so would restore the patent system to a state where the public
interest is paramount.

